In addition , when consider the transaction cost to the linear demand function ; the retailer has lower outcome level than general linear demand function 另外,當(dāng)考慮交易成本于通路競(jìng)爭(zhēng)時(shí)零售商相關(guān)行銷(xiāo)變數(shù)將會(huì)比采取一般線(xiàn)性需求函數(shù)下有較低的產(chǎn)出水準(zhǔn)。
In the multi - oligarchs cournot model of non - linear demand function condition of the right angle hyperbolic , the enterprise only can make a profit when the majority of enterprises in the profession participates in the annexation is proved and the number of the enterprise which the profession can hold in the balanced market scale is explained when the enterprise has the fixed cost in the open market 摘要通過(guò)以直角雙曲線(xiàn)為需求函數(shù)的行業(yè)的多寡頭骨諾模型的分析,證明了行業(yè)中企業(yè)的兼并只有在大部分企業(yè)參與時(shí)才是有利可圖的,并給出了在開(kāi)放性的市場(chǎng)中,當(dāng)企業(yè)存在固定成本時(shí)在均衡市場(chǎng)規(guī)模下所能夠容納的企業(yè)數(shù)目。
In chapter 3 , we chiefly study on the effectivity of third - degree price discrimination under two manufacturers , generally the studies on the effectivity of third - degree price discrimination in former papers were based on monopoly market , that is there is only one monopoly manufacturer in market . this paper expand the content of its research to the market conditions of two factories , based on a complete static information model and the linear demand functions and linear cost functions , the paper study the effectivity of third - degree price discrimination under two manufacturers , which compete in the same markets . it further respectively put forward the calculation formulas of the maximum sales volume and the maximum price and the maximum profit which belong to both manufacturers who is on the condition of common price or third - degree price discrimination in the two sub - markets , and also it put forward the necessary and sufficient conditions for third - degree price discrimination to be effective or to be same as common price 本文第三章主要研究了兩廠(chǎng)商情形下的三度價(jià)格歧視的有效性問(wèn)題,現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)對(duì)于三度價(jià)格歧視的有效性問(wèn)題的研究基本上都是基于壟斷廠(chǎng)商情形,即市場(chǎng)上只有一個(gè)壟斷廠(chǎng)商的情形,而本文將其研究的內(nèi)容拓展到了兩廠(chǎng)商情形,基于完全信息靜態(tài)模型研究了競(jìng)爭(zhēng)市場(chǎng)上的兩廠(chǎng)商在線(xiàn)性需求函數(shù)和線(xiàn)性成本函數(shù)條件下的三度價(jià)格歧視的有效性問(wèn)題,并分別給出了兩廠(chǎng)商在兩個(gè)子市場(chǎng)上,在單一價(jià)格條件下以及歧視價(jià)格條件下的最優(yōu)銷(xiāo)售量、最優(yōu)價(jià)格和最大利潤(rùn)的計(jì)算公式,給出了各廠(chǎng)商價(jià)格歧視有效和價(jià)格歧視無(wú)異于單一價(jià)格的充要條件。